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Time for Yushchenko to Step Up 
by Tammy Lynch 
 
Last week, Ukraine’s parliament (Verkhovna Rada) rejected a number of 
measures that would have brought the country’s trade regulations in line with 
international norms and that would have moved the country closer to meeting the 
requirements for World Trade Organization (WTO) entry. The bills included two 
“make or break” issues: the United States is demanding that Ukraine tighten 
copyright and piracy laws before it will consent to its WTO entry, and Australia 
has stated that without the adjustment of domestic Sugar quotas, it will not 
support Ukraine’s request to enter the trade organization. Parliament refused to 
undertake either of these reforms. (1) Although negotiations with the government 
over re-votes continue, the rejections make it extremely difficult for Ukraine to 
complete its preparations for WTO entry this year. 
 
This parliamentary action invites questions not only about Ukraine’s future 
economic policy, but also about the ability of Ukrainian President Viktor 
Yushchenko to fulfill his promises to investors, foreign governments and 
international organizations. These votes disturbingly call into question 
Yushchenko’s ability to influence members of his own political party, as well as 
members of allied parties. On more than one occasion, had all members of 
Yushchenko’s own party voted in support of a WTO-related bill, it would have 
passed. But they did not. 
 
A May 31 vote to tighten copyright and piracy laws – a vote necessary to win US 
support for Ukraine’s WTO bid, and a bill strongly supported by Yushchenko – 
came up 17 votes short of the needed 226 majority. During this vote, 27 of 
Yushchenko’s party members did not vote, were not present, or were opposed to 
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the measure. Following the vote, MPs complained that they had not been 
informed of the vote nor received any instructions. 
 
Recent WTO-related votes displayed a similar pattern. In a particularly egregious 
example, the 23 June re-vote of the piracy bill fell just 11 votes short of passage, 
while exactly 11 members of Our Ukraine did not vote in favor. 
 
Of the 89 members of Our Ukraine, 21 chose not to support a vote on 
standardization of technical trade regulations. That vote failed by 23 votes. Two 
members of the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, who were working outside of the 
building, reportedly were prepared, in case the vote would be close, to return for 
voting should it be necessary. Based on the 21 Our Ukraine defections, it was 
not. Every other Tymoshenko Bloc member (35 out of 37) however, voted in 
favor. 
 
In addition, members of two parties identified by Yushchenko as allies generally 
have not supported the initiatives. Parliamentary Speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn’s 
People’s Party, which Yushchenko invited to join his electoral bloc for the 
upcoming parliamentary election, has been fractured on the WTO votes. Only 4 
out of 40 deputies in the party supported the initiative to alter Sugar quotas, while 
only between half and three-quarters of its members have supported other 
measures. 
 
More questionable has been the response of the Party of Industrialists and 
Entrepreneurs, headed by First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Kinakh. Kinakh is 
both a Yushchenko ally and a Tymoshenko foe, who at times has criticized the 
prime minister aggressively. Still, he was tasked by Yushchenko and 
Tymoshenko to work as an intermediary between the government and the 
parliament, and to represent the government in its relations with business 
organizations. 
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On Saturday, Kinakh said, “If such countries as Russia and Kazakhstan pass 
ahead of us, we will face difficulties with entering the WTO, as these countries 
will view us as a powerful rival. That is why we should speed up this process.” 
(2) However, just two days earlier, only four out of 15 of Kinakh’s party supported 
the vote on anti-piracy legislation. Even more, on the same day, not one member 
of Kinakh’s party voted in favor of standardizing technical trade regulations with 
WTO norms. The votes suggest either that Kinakh is unable even marginally to 
influence his own party, or that he is working against the government to which he 
was appointed by Yushchenko.  
 
Yushchenko has stated for months that without passage of 26 WTO-related bills, 
Ukraine will miss the late-July deadline for WTO entry in 2005, and will not move 
forward on its obligations under the EU-Ukraine Action Plan. These initiatives, he 
said, are in the “basic strategic interests of Ukraine,” where “we see our future in 
integration with Europe.” (3) Yushchenko also repeatedly has promised 
international investors that WTO-related reforms will be enacted in order to 
improve the country’s difficult investment climate. 
 
Nevertheless, the president has been unable to translate rhetoric into reality, and 
surprisingly has had little tangible impact on the process. One of the primary 
reasons for this may be the president’s decision to remain detached from the 
day-to-day governing of the country. 
 
In particular, Yushchenko has shown a perplexing aversion to becoming involved 
in the parliamentary process, leaving this duty almost solely to his parliamentary 
allies and his Prime Minister, Yulia Tymoshenko. “While the President has spent 
much of his time abroad appeasing investors with liberal free-market talk,” 
Roman Olearchyk wrote, “the dirty work has been left to Tymoshenko.” (4) This 
tactic is surprising, since the Ukrainian president is customarily the leader to 
whom MPs and others look for guidance and input. 
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The largely negative response to WTO-related measures from Parliamentary 
Speaker Lytvyn’s People’s Party can be explained partly by Lytvyn’s obvious 
irritation at what he views as Yushchenko¹s lack of attention. “Practically no 
letters sent from parliament to the presidential administration are getting through 
to President Yushchenko,” he said. “At best, they are answered by a deputy 
[state secretary]. I have come to a conclusion that he does not answer them. At 
least in [former President] Leonid Kuchma¹s administration, they put his 
signature for him. Now, they can't even be bothered to put a signature.” (5) 
 
The president’s decision to leave the legislative fulfillment of one of his 
cornerstone campaign initiatives to Tymoshenko is also surprising, given the 
antipathy toward her from some of Our Ukraine’s most senior members in 
parliament and the power checks the president has placed upon her. 
 
It is no secret that many Our Ukraine members opposed Tymoshenko’s 
appointment as prime minister, which she earned by virtue of her co-leadership 
during the Orange Revolution. They also grouse privately at Tymoshenko¹s 
refusal to merge her own expanding political party, Motherland, with Our Ukraine 
(to be called People’s Union Our Ukraine during the upcoming parliamentary 
elections). Her ability to retain her position after next March’s parliamentary 
elections is unknown. 
 
Even more, although Yushchenko essentially has left the WTO legislative work to 
Tymoshenko, the president’s relationship with Our Ukraine party founder and 
rumored revolution financier Petro Poroshenko serves to undermine her 
influence in the parliament. 
 
Poroshenko was the man reportedly chosen by Our Ukraine to be prime 
minister. Instead, Yushchenko named Poroshenko as the secretary of the 
National Security and Defense Council, which the president then imbued with 
significant additional responsibilities – many duplicating the prime minister’s. 
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Yushchenko gave Poroshenko the right to vote at cabinet meetings and also 
appointed his own presidential representative to the cabinet. He gave 
Poroshenko a hand in everything from privatization policy to budget formulation. 
At the same time, Yushchenko turned a blind eye to Poroshenko’s maintenance 
of his parliamentary mandate, which violates the constitution of the country. By 
remaining in parliament and voting regularly, Poroshenko remains de facto one 
of the primary leaders of Our Ukraine. 
 
Poroshenko’s position implies that although Yushchenko felt duty-bound to name 
his revolution partner to be prime minister, Tymoshenko does not have his total 
support. This fact, in addition to animosity from some members of Our Ukraine, 
and the prime minister’s precarious employment status in the next year, 
undermine Tymoshenko’s ability to influence certain MPs (particularly those 
within Our Ukraine). Yushchenko’s assistance, therefore, is necessary on difficult 
legislation. But for some reason, the president has been either disinclined or 
unable to provide active assistance on WTO-related bills. 
 
In a recent interview, James Sherr, a Fellow of the Conflict Studies Research 
Centre at the United Kingdom Defence Academy, said, “Some speculate that he 
[Yushchenko] is deliberately staying aloof so that she [Tymoshenko] can fail – so 
that she, rather than he, will be blamed. I hope these speculations are wrong…” 
(6) Regardless, while Yulia Tymoshenko is one of the most energetic and 
capable prime ministers the country has seen, there are certainly enough 
problems facing the country to provide work for both the head of state and the 
head of government. 
 
The negative economic effect of the rejection of these WTO-related bills could be 
large; the majority of Ukraine’s traditional trading partners are now within not only 
the WTO, but also the European Union free trade zone. In contrast, rejection 
would mean that Ukraine would continue to be subject to export quotas and anti-
dumping investigations. 
 6 
 
Ukrainian Economics Minister Serhiy Teryokhin recently estimated the benefit of 
WTO entry to Ukraine’s economy at $1.5 billion per year. (7) As the Ukrainian 
economy cools under the weight of high energy and low steel prices, that money 
will become even more necessary. 
 
To be sure, Viktor Yushchenko is an impressive, inspirational man. He is a man 
who has provided his country with a vision of a better future and the possibility to 
reach it. His government has responded, albeit in fits and starts, with good 
progress in a number of difficult areas. These include tackling the illicit smuggling 
trade, tax evasion, government corruption, and the shadow economy. The 
challenges are huge – and much larger than originally thought. In order to 
continue moving forward, President Yushchenko must understand that it is time 
to do the work necessary to make his vision a reality. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) WTO-related bills include: 
-- Bill Number 7032, “On Introducing Amendments in Certain Laws (including the 
Criminal Code, the law "On the Particulars of State Regulation of Subjects of 
Economic Activities' Operations Connected with Production, Export, Import of 
Discs for Laser Reading Systems," and the law "On Licensing certain Types of 
Economic Activity),” read 31 May 2005 and 23 June 2005, did not pass. 
-- Bill Number 7568 (erroneously referred to as Bill 7569 by Ukrainian News 
Agency), “On Introducing Amendments in the Law of Ukraine on State 
Regulation of Production and Sale of Sugar,” read on 23 June 2005, did not pass. 
-- Bill Number 7569, “On Amendments and Addenda to the Law of Ukraine on 
Automobile Industry Development,” read on 24 June 2005, passed with 258 
votes. 
-- Bills Number 7586, “On Development and Application of Standards, Technical 
Regulations and Procedures for Assessing Compatibility,” and Number 7595, 
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“On Introducing Amendments in Certain Ukrainian Laws (On State Regulation of 
Agricultural Products, On Ensuring Sanitary and Epidemiological Well-Being of 
the Population, On Foreign Economic Trade, On Pesticides and Agricultural 
Chemicals, On Protecting the Population from Infectious Diseases, On Protection 
of Plants, On Licensing Certain Types of Business Activities),” read on 22 June 
2005, did not pass. 
For specific vote information on these and other Verkhovna Rada bills, see 
www.rada.gov.ua. 
(2) UNIAN News Agency, 25 Jun 05. 
(3) Ukrayinska Pravda, 23 May 05, and Agence France Presse, 5:26 PM GMT, 7 
Jun 05. 
(4) Businessweek International, 20 Jun 05, p. 30. 
(5) One Plus One TV, 4 Jun 05; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(6) Den (The Day) Weekly Digest #20 in English, 14 Jun 05. See 
www.day.kiev.ua/138816 for the entire interview, in which Sherr has sobering 
criticism for both Yushchenko and Tymoshenko. 
(7) UNIAN News Agency, 22 Jun 05 via The Action Ukraine Report (contact 
ArtUkraine.com@starpower.net or morganw@patriot.net for subscription 
information). 
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